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INTRODUCTION

After the atrocities of the Second World War, Europe realized
that individual states could not be trusted to protect the rights and
freedoms of their citizens.' In response, various organizations and
charters-including the Council of Europe and European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) 2-aimed to protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms on the supranational level.3 The
Convention protects individuals from the actions of their own states
by providing an extensive list of rights and freedoms. 4 To enforce
these individual rights and freedoms, the Convention established the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).5 But in Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 6 seven judges sitting on the ECHR delivered a crushing blow that
potentially destroys the efforts made by countless treaties to protect an
individual's right to free exercise of religion, expression, education,
7
and gender equality.
1
See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS § 1 (3d ed. 1998).

2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signatureNov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
3

See id.; see also L.J. CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE

CONVENTION 2-4 (1994)

(noting that part of the Council's objective was to promote Euro-

pean political unity and to protect human rights). Other non-European organizations and
charters created after the Second World War with this purpose in mind obviously include
the United Nations and the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See CLEMENTS, supra, at 1-2.
4 See Convention, supra note 2, § 1.
5 The original organization of the Convention's enforcement bodies consisted of
both a Commission and Court. Id. art. 19. The two separate bodies were replaced by a
single court in 1998. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into
force Nov. 1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
155.htm. For more details on the Commission and the Court, see CLARE OVEY & ROBIN
WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS §§

7-8 (3d ed.

2002); VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 1, §§ 7-8.
6 No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application Number).
7 See discussion infra Part III.
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In $ahin, the ECHR upheld a Turkish Constitutional Court ruling
that approved a ban on head coverings and other forms of religious
attire-including headscarves worn as a manifestation of Islamic
faith-in Turkish universities.8 Leyla Sahin, a fifth-year medical student at the University of Istanbul, was only one of the tens of
thousands of students who were faced with an uncomfortable choice
as a result of the ban: to abandon her religious convictions for the
opportunity to complete her last few months of medical education or
to manifest her religious beliefs and be banned from the university. 9
The decision of the ECHR to uphold this headscarf ban in $ahin
was incorrectly reasoned. But more importantly, the fallout of the decision in both Turkey and other European countries will be enormous. $ahin is particularly damaging to the rights of women who
practice traditional Islam in Turkey-those who wear a headscarf out
of a sense of personal religious obligation. Because they must choose
between access to public education and expressing their religious convictions, those devout Turkish Muslim women who choose to wear the
headscarf-and admittedly those who are forced to wear it-will be
denied educational opportunities.
The $ahin decision also proclaims the victory and legitimization
of "secularism"' 10 in the battle against Islamic fundamentalism. But in
reality, it approves of the continuous threats of the Turkish military to
intervene in the democratically elected Turkish government when the
military believes Turkish secularism is in danger. Turkey has struggled to attain and maintain its democratic identity since Mustafa
Kemal Atatfirk reformed the country's legal system in the 1920s. 11
Since Ataturk's reforms, the Turkish government, de facto led by its
influential military, has battled to suppress the influence of fundamentalist Islamic groups and political organizations that threaten to
overthrow Turkey's supposed democratic and secular system and return Turkey to Sharia-based rule. 12 As part of the military plan to
suppress these extremist groups, the government spearheaded efforts
to ban the Islamic headscarf from state institutions, including
3
universities.'
Although $ahin was not the Court's first attempt to limit the application of the religious freedoms protected by Article 9 of the Con-

s

$ahin, No. 44774/98.

9 See discussion infra Part II.A.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part I. This struggle also colors Turkey's most recent reform efforts in the
hope of joining the European Union. See Susan Sachs, Turkey's Law Overhaul Overwhelms
Courts and Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A3.
12 See, e.g., Turkey's Ban on Islamists Comes into Effect, BBC NEws, Feb. 22, 1998, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/59030.stm.
13 See discussion infta Part I.B.
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vention, 14 it represents the most far-reaching impediment to personal
freedoms and rights the Court has imposed to date. Significantly, because the ruling court was not a national court, but rather an international court, its decision has binding and precedential effect on all
states that are signatories to the Convention, and thus will affect other
countries that are currently involved in their own versions of the headscarf debate, such as France and Germany. 15 Although Turkey and
other European nations with religious-dress bans have different histories, constitutions, and laws, as well as religious-symbol bans of varying
degrees of permissiveness, the $ahin decision will likely influence subsequent national court decisions on the topic. Perhaps more significantly, the decision may give carte blanche to any of the forty-plus
signatories of the Convention to promulgate similar laws that on their
faces merely hinder religious expression, but on a much deeper level
discriminate against minority groups, deny equal opportunities to women, and potentially limit access to education.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical conflict between Turkey's secularists and Islamists concerning the manifestation of religious belief in a constitutionally secular Turkish society and examines
Turkey's Constitution and religious statutes. Part II details the background of $ahin and the reasoning behind the ECHR's decision to
uphold the Turkish headscarf ban. Part III analyzes the ECHR's decision, first criticizing the ECHR for deferring too much to the Turkish
Constitutional Court in making its own determination about the legality of the ban, and then attacking the ECHR's reasoning as politically
motivated by its own Eurocentric concept of the Islamic headscarf and
its fears concerning fundamentalist and extremist Islam.
I
THE RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN SECULAR TURKEY

According to a textbook distributed by the Turkish government
to third-grade students, a secular country is defined by five criteria:
(1) affairs of the state and religion are kept separate; (2) freedom of
worship, belief, and conscience is protected, but fanaticism is never
tolerated; (3) extremist movements are avoided; (4) no one may force
any person to embrace a religion or sect; and (5) the use of religion
for personal gain is not permitted. 16 Respect for these criteria permeates Turkish society; they are often expressed on any occasion when
the name Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk is mentioned-during school func14 See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
15 See generally Axel Frhr. von Campenhausen, The German HeadscarfDebate, 2004 BYU
L. Rev. 665 (discussing the German and French debates).
16

DAVID SHANL.AND, ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN TuRrEt 24-25 (1999).
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tions, on formal religious holidays, and in political speeches. 17 Ataturk receives this reverence because Turkey attributes its modern and
so-called "secular" democratic government to the drastic changes he
made to Turkish society and government after liberating Turkey from
the foreign occupiers who had invaded after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.1 8 But the interpretation of these criteria-and of secularism itself-can vary greatly. The following sections of this Note
detail the evolution of Atatfirk's postrevolution religious restrictions
and the conflict among various factions of the Turkish political spectrum concerning religious practice and the definition of a secular democracy in a country that is ninety-nine percent Muslim.1 9
A.

Atatfirk's "Secular" Turkey
1. Religious Restriction in Atatfirk's Secular Turkey

Atatfirk, the founding father and first president of modern Turkey, believed that Western culture, with its greater technological and
economic development, was superior to Islamic culture. 20 This view
prompted him to implement radical reforms that he believed would
immediately modernize Turkey and make it competitive with the
West.2 1 In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, in which the central government was significantly entangled with Islam, 22 Atatfurk engaged in
a "scorched-earth campaign against religious power" that not only destroyed Turkey's previous entanglement with Islam, but, to the oppo17

Id. at 25.

18

See

NICOLE POPE

& HUGH POPE, TURKEY UNVEILED: ATATORK AND AFTER 50-62

(1997).
19

BUREAU

INTERNATIONAL

OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY:

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/

2004/35489.htm.
20
See POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 62; Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and
State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 61, 65 (2002). Evidence
suggests that Atatfirk not only felt Western culture was superior, but also that he actually
despised religion in general. Atatfirk's biographer, Jacque Benoist-MCchin, claims that
when Atatfirk was angry, he described Islam as "the absurd theology of an immoral
Bedouin" and a "putrefied corpse that poisons our life." POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at
67-68. Atatirk also once remarked, "I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at
the bottom of the sea." STEPHEN KINZER, CRESCENT AND STAR: TURKEY BETWEEN Two
WORLDS 62 (2001).
21
See POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 62.

22 The Ottoman government combined the positions of head of state and caliph (the
highest Islamic religious leader) into one. See Talip Kucukcan, State, Islam, and Religious
Liberty in Modern Turkey: Reconfiguration of Religion in the PublicSphere, 2003 BYU L. REv. 475,
477. The Ottoman government also employed the millet system, which defined each religious community within Turkey as a separate nation. Id. at 480. Under the millet system,
each individual ethnic and religious group had its own court system and independent institutions for education and social security. Id. at 482-83. The government also forced people to dress according to their religious affiliations. See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/
98, para. 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R.June 29, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?
skin=hudoc-en (search by Application Number).
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site extreme, also significantly restricted an individual's ability to
practice the religion. 2 3 Atatfirk was determined to modernize Turkey,
24
and to Atattirk this meant removing Islam's influence on society.
Atatdirk called his modernization process "secularism"; later it became
25
known as Kemalism.
The Grand National Assembly drafted the first constitution of
Atatfirk's Turkish Republic in 1921, proclaiming the principle of "national sovereignty" and emphasizing a Turkish national identity instead of a religious one. 26 Interestingly, while Turkey's second,
majoritarian constitution proclaimed in 1924 that "the religion of the
Turkish state is Islam," 27 a 1928 constitutional amendment deleted
this clause.2 8 A 1937 amendment finally constitutionalized the Turk29
ish cornerstone principle of secularism.
Atatfurk further targeted the institutional framework of Islam
through a complete statutory overhaul. In 1924, Turkey abolished the
caliphate and in 1926 officially abandoned the Sharia rule of the old
Ottoman regime.3 0 Under the Education Services (Merger) Act of 3
March 1924, the Ministry of Education assumed control of all schools,
and religious schools were closed. 3 1 In 1935, the government abolished religious study from the primary and secondary school
32
curricula.
Atatfirk's religious reform further curtailed the use of Islamic
symbols and personal religious expression. A 1923 decree on dress
was the first governmental action that regulated clothing.3 3 Subsequently, the Hat Law of 1925 banned the fez and required men to
23

KINZER,

supra note 20, at 61.

24 See generally Kucukcan, supra note 22, at 485-89 (noting that Atattirk aimed to modernize Turkey by reducing Islamic influence in three ways: (1) by limiting the symbolic use
of Islam; (2) by removing Islam's institutional hold over politics and the government; and
(3) by replacing the Islamic legal and educational systems with Western-style systems).
25 See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 65.
26 See Ergun Ozbudun, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 19, 21
(Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1996).
27

ELISABETH OZDALGA, THE VEILING ISSUE, OFFICIAL SECULARISM AND POPULAR ISLAM

TURKEY 19, 22 (1998); see Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 21. According to the
majoritarian concept of democracy, sovereignty is the general, or majority, will of the people and is "absolute, indivisible, and infallible." Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 21. The 1924
Constitution had no system of checks and balances. Id.
28
OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 19.
29 See Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 27 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number); 0ZDALGA, supra note 27, at 19.
30 See NIYAZi BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 467-73 (1964).
31
$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 30.
IN MODERN

32

OZDALGA,

33

See

supra note 27, at 20.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH'S CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HIGHER EDUCATION,
AND ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN WHO WEAR THE HEADSCARF

26 (2004),

available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/headscarf-memo.pdf.
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wear a modern type of felt hat.34 And in 1934, the Dress (Regula-

tions) Act banned all religious attire other than in places of worship
and set specific guidelines for the proper dress for students and state
employees.

35

Notably, none of the acts Atatfirk introduced reference women's
clothing-including the Islamic headscarf.3 6 While Atatfirk's policies
may have strongly discouraged the headscarf, "in a bow to custom" he
never outlawed it.3v In fact, Atatirk himself took a relaxed position

concerning the headscarf, often taking pictures for official public business with his first wife, who wore a headscarf in public.3 8 Atatfirk
once wrote, "The religious covering of women will not cause difficulty.
. . . This simple style [of headcovering] is not in conflict with the

morals and manners of our society." 39 Thus, in the working-class
neighborhoods of smaller cities and the countryside, most women
40
continued to cover their heads.
2.

Religious Tolerance and the Birth of PoliticalIslam

Atatfirk's death and his successor's unpopularity heralded the
end of a one-party Turkey and the birth of a multiparty system in
1946, in which each party had its own definition of secularism and
policies regarding religious expression. 41 Under Turkey's new multiparty system, politicians and government officials began using relig42
ion as a political tool to consolidate and expand electoral support.
Even during Atatfirk's revolution, many of his own supporters believed that the nationalist movement was a war "for Islam against the
unbeliever rather than for Turkey against the foreigner."43 Without
Atatfirk, politicians took the opportunity to moderate his extreme
form of secularism. Atatfirk's own Republican People's Party began to
44
ease the restrictions many of his antireligious statutes had imposed.
For example, the government allowed private religious schools to op34
See id.; OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 41 (referring to the law as the well-known "$apka
Kanunu").
35
$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 29; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 26.
36
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 26.
37
See JENNY B. WHITE, ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN TURKEY 35 (2002). Although the
headscarf was not outlawed, White asserts that "those covering their heads found no place
in the banks, ministries, and schools of the new nation." Id.
38
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 26.
39
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 1 ATATORKISM 126 (1982)).
40
WHITE, supra note 37, at 35.
41
See POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 72; Dokupil, supra note 20, at 71; see also MEHMET
YASAR GEYIKDACI, POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY: THE ROLE OF ISLAM 69-70 (1984) (discussing the varying attitudes of different political parties to religion after the adoption of the
multiparty system).
42
See POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 318.
43
BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM IN HISTORY 224 (2d ed. 1993).
44
See KINZER, supra note 20, at 62.
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erate again by 1947. 4 5 By 1948, religion classes were reintroduced in
primary and secondary schools, 4 6 and the government subsequently
authorized the opening of schools to train imams and a theology de47
partment at the University of Ankara.
When the Democrat Party (DP) gained control in 1950, the easing of religious restrictions continued, as an increasing number of
Turks made the pilgrimage to Mecca, mosque attendance rose, and
more women began to wear headscarves. 48 Eventually, the government actually made Islamic religious instruction in public schools
mandatory. 49 But in 1953, after a series of religiously motivated violent acts by conservative Islamists, the DP passed the Law to Protect
the Freedom of Conscience, which penalized the use of religion for
50
political purposes.
Despite this new law, as the Turkish economy worsened and the
regime's popularity declined, the DP increasingly reversed its previous
51
stance and attempted to appeal to Islamic sympathies for support.
In 1960, the military staged a successful coup against the DP government. 52 Surprisingly, instead of being antagonistic towards Islam and

returning the country to Atatfirk-style secularism, the new government
continued to recognize Islam as an important part of the Turkish
identity. 53 In 1961, the government drafted a new, pluralistic constitu-

tion, 54 which in addition to establishing a Constitutional Court with
judicial review powers, 55 provided for "freedom of religious faith and
worship and freedom from abuse of one's religion by others. '5 6 It also
"stipulated that [Turkish] law could not infringe upon the essence of
'5 7
any right or liberty.
Throughout the 1960s, Turkish politicians increasingly appealed
to Islamic sensibilities in order to gain electoral support.5 8 By 1970,
45

G aiiDAci, supra note 41, at 69.

46

OZDALGA,

supra note 27, at 20.

See GEYIKDA6I, supra note 41, at 67-68.
48
Dokupil, supra note 20, at 74.
49
See id. at 75.
50
See id.
51
See KINZER, supra note 20, at 63.
52
Id.
53
See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 76.
54
Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 23. The 1961 Constitution's drafters included a system
of checks and balances and limited the powerful role the Assembly had played under the
1924 Constitution. See id. The drafters believed that "the public good would be better
served by allowing for the free interplay of opposing forces than by concentrating all legitimate authority in a single branch of government." Id.
55
See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 77.
56
See 2 STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND
MODERN TURKEY 418 (1977) (citing TURK. CONST. of 1961, art. 19).
57
Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 24.
58
See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 78-80.
47
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both major political parties, Sfuleyman Demirel's Justice Party and
Bfilent Ecevit's Republican People's Party, had adopted a moderate
stance on religion. 59 But further social and economic distress
prompted a second military coup in 1971,60 and with it the birth of
the influence of political Islam in Turkish politics. 6' Necmettin
Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP), which can perhaps best be
described as Turkey's Islamic party, 62 became the significant third-

party player in Turkish coalition governments until its dissolution in
1980.63 Initially expressing more moderate religious beliefs, Erbakan

soon began to openly campaign against Kemalist secularism, advocating instead a fundamentalist view of Islam. 64 Despite the NSP's philosophy that Islam and secularism could not coexist, Erbakan never
65
actually called for an Islamic state in Turkey.
B.

The Turkish Army's "Secular" Turkey
1.

The Coup and Constitution

By the end of the 1970s, political polarization, religiously motivated violence, and rampant terrorism plunged Turkey into a state of
crisis and instability. 6 6 Claiming that Turkish law made it the army's
duty to protect the Republic, the military seized control of the government a third time in a bloodless coup in 1980, this time led by General Kenan Evren. 67 To lead the newly vacant government, Evren
established the National Security Council (NSC), which, under
Evren's control, abolished the Grand National Assembly and banned
all political parties and politicians that were active before the military
59

See idA at 78-79.

60

Id. at 80.

61
See id. at 118 (describing "political Islam" as religious "interference" in politics and
state affairs).
62 Erbakan officially or unofficially led various versions of his first political party, the
National Order Party (NOP), each with the common theme of using, to varying degrees,
traditional Islamic symbols to gain electoral support and to reestablish a stronger connection between Turkey and its Islamic past. See id. at 81-85.
63 See id. at 80-81.
64 See id. at 86-87.
65 See id. at 87. Despite the NSP's political move not to openly call for a return to a
Sharia form of government in Turkey and subsequent loss of popularity, secularists were
still worried about the party's radical religious views. See id. at 92.
66 See Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 24. Much of the violence was religiously motivated:
Fundamentalist Islamists violently attacked and terrorized establishments that they considered counter to Islam and the Koran. See KINZER, supra note 20, at 65, for examples of
violent incidents before the coup.
67
POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 141-42. The army met absolutely no resistance in its
attempt to take control of the crisis-ridden government. See id. Not only did the Turkish
press and commentators welcome the coup, so did some politicians, who even went so far
as to congratulate Evren on his success. See id. at 142-43. "[M]ilitants on both sides
seemed to give up, almost with relief, as if a referee had blown a whistle." Id. at 141.
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coup. 68

The NSC further amended the 1961 Constitution to grant
itself more power and legal immunity. 69 It quickly passed the Law on
the Constitutional Order, which provided the NSC power to amend
the 1961 Constitution simply through the NSC's own laws, declarations, and decisions, and declared that none of the NSC's actions
could be found unconstitutional. 70 Most significantly, the NSC passed
the Law on the Constituent Assembly, which provided for the creation
of a new constitution. 71 According to Evren, "The 1961 constitution
was too loose a garment .... We have to sacrifice some personal rights
for the security of the community .... "72
The military's 1982 Constitution claimed to herald a return to the
"nationalism of Atatfirk. '' 73 Historians Nicole and Hugh Pope assert
that due to the "ever-present Turkish fear of separatism" from fundamentalist Islamic groups, the drafters of the 1982 Constitution focused on the protection of the indivisibility of the state. Indeed, the
Constitution contains more than fourteen references to this national
interest. 74 The Constitution's chief architect, Orhan Aldikacti, professed, "We have built an armoured wall against those who want to
split our country."75 The Constitution declares Turkey "a democratic,
secular and social state governed by the rule of law; . . . loyal to the
nationalism of Atatfirk. ''76 Yet secularism is never defined. Seemingly
inspired by the fear of religious violence and the fundamentalist
movement's call for a return to an Islamic state, the NSC included a
provision prohibiting the amendment of the constitutional provisions
establishing the form of the republic and its essential characteristics77
including its indivisibility and secularism.
While the 1982 Constitution ostensibly grants numerous rights
and civil liberties, it simultaneously contains provisions that the government could arguably use to restrict religious liberty in the name of
safeguarding the republic's interests. For example, Article 10 discusses the principles of equality in the Turkish Republic: "All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of
68 See Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 24. The NSC originally consisted of the Chief of the
General Staff (who was Evren at the time) and the Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Gendarmerie. Id. A 1995 constitutional amendment repealed the ban on political parties. See id. at 25.
69 See id. at 24-25.
70 See id. at 24.
71 See id. at 25 & n.4.
72
POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 148.
73 1982 TotivE CuMHuRrYETI ANAYASASi [TuP.,. CONST.] art. 2, available at http://www.
tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm (in English).
74
POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 149.
75 Id. at 150.
76 TuRK. CONST. art. 2 (emphasis added).
77 See id. art. 4.
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language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations." 7 But the Article goes on
to limit this proclamation of nondiscrimination: "No privilege shall be
granted to any individual, family, group or class." 79 The meaning of
"privilege" is never defined.
Similarly, Article 24 grants the public the "right to freedom of
conscience, religious belief and conviction." 8 0 However, these freedoms are limited as well: Religious activity and expression cannot endanger the indivisibility or secularism of the republic.8 1 Nor can
anyone "exploit or abuse religion" or religious symbols for any political purpose or cause state affairs "to be based on religious precepts,
even if only in part. '8 2 By not defining critical terms, such as "exploit
or abuse religion," the drafters implicitly granted the interpretive
branch of the government the power to define the parameters of
these limitations.
The limitations in Article 14 are similarly vague and susceptible to
politicized interpretation, and have the potential to drastically limit
freedom of religious expression:
None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution
shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity
of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic
based upon human rights.
No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner
that enables the State or individuals to destroy the fundamental
rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution or to stage an
activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively than stated
83
in the Constitution.
Thus, the seemingly long list of guaranteed freedoms are actually
tempered by caveats and restrictions capable of completely eliminating the freedoms. Pope and Pope cynically summarize these "partial
freedoms":
'No one shall be required to perform forced labour', except when
ordered to do so by the government. 'Everyone has the right to freedom of residence and movement', but the government may decide
to the contrary for reasons including social, economic and urban
Id. art. 10 (amended 2004).
Id.; see Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number) (describing Turkey's argument that recognizing a right to wear headscarves was
"tantamount to claiming a priviledge for a religion").
80
TuRK.CONST. art. 24.
See id. arts. 14 (amended 2001), 24.
81
Id. art. 24.
82
83
Id. art. 14 (amended 2001).
78
79
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development .... 'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought
and opinion', but not, of course, if this conflicts with the preamble's
vague 'determination that no protection shall be afforded to
84
thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests.'

2.

The NCS's Assault on the Headscarf

Elected President in the same election that ratified the 1982 Constitution,85 Evren and the constitutionalized NSC 86 immediately began
to reverse the liberalization of the dress regulations implemented after Atatfirk's death. New NSC-sponsored regulations specifically
banned the headscarf for the first time since Atatfirk founded his
modem republic. In 1981, the Regulation Concerning the Dress of
Students and Staff in Schools prohibited wearing any type of headscarf by requiring staff at public organizations and institutions to wear
"ordinary, sober, modern dress." 8 7 A year later, under pressure from
the NSC, 88

the Higher Education Council (HEC) banned Islamic

headscarves in lecture rooms. 89 Two years later, the Supreme Administrative Court (Dani~tay) upheld these HEC regulations, describing
the headscarf as a symbol of views that are contrary to the ideals of
secularism and women's equality. 90
Pressure from the different Islamic groups, however, led the HEC
to ease these restrictions, and in 1984 it allowed students to wear
84

POPE & POPE,

supra note 18, at 148-49 (quoting TuRK. CONST. arts. 18, 23, 25 &

pmbl.).
See id. at 150.
TuRy CONST. art. 118. The new NSC consists of the senior generals and the most
important ministers. See id. "Most of Turkey's strategic decisions have been taken at [the
NSC's] monthly meetings.... under the chairmanship of the president of the republic."
POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 150.
87
Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 33 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 27.
88
OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 41.
89 See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 34. Not surprisingly, the President appoints the
members of the HEC. See TuPK. CONST. art. 131 (amended 2004). The HEC is alternatively known as the Higher Education Authority, the Council of Higher Education, and the
Yiksek 6gretim Kurulu (YOK). See id.; $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 34; OZDALGA, supra note
27, at 41.
90 See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 34. The Danitayis Turkey's highest administrative
court, also referred to as the Council of State, and deals with governmental action and
general administrative disputes. See TurkishEmbassy.org, Republic of Turkey, The Administrative Courts and the Council of State, http://www.turkishembassy.org/governmentpoli
tics/politicsjdacourts.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005). As the highest administrative court,
it is the final court for cases under its own jurisdiction. Id. It is also the highest consultative body of the state, expressing its opinions on draft legislation when the Prime Minister
and the Council of Ministers request it to do so. Id.
85
86
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headscarves that were in line with "contemporary clothing."91 By the
end of 1986, Evren sent a warning to the HEC about the "increasing
92
influence of 'reactionary tendencies,"' particularly in universities.
In response, the HEC issued new, more stringent dress regulations,
which despite their apparent restriction on religious expression, were
loose enough to support very different interpretations.9 3 This interpretive flexibility led individual Turkish universities to implement the
regulation differently: Some universities, and even departments within
the same universities, allowed the headscarf, while others prohibited

it.94

In 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, leader of the Motherland
Party (ANAP), and the board of university presidents attempted to
gradually lift any remaining prohibition on headscarves.9 5 Parliament
accepted the ANAP-proposed law to lift the ban, but Evren used his
presidential veto to prevent Parliament from enacting it.96 In response to the veto, the ANAP and Parliament passed an amnesty law
to allow students who had previously been expelled from universities
for wearing headscarves to resume their educations. 9 7 Instead of vetoing this second law, Evren brought the issue to the Turkish Constitu98
tional Court, which ruled against the amnesty law.
The Turkish government subsequently passed section 16 of the
Higher Education Act in 1988 in an attempt to relax the Constitutional Court's restrictions by expressly providing that "[a] veil or headscarf covering the neck and hair may be worn out of religious
conviction" in certain establishments, including higher-education institutions.9 9 The Constitutional Court responded by finding that section 16 violated the constitutional principles of secularism, equality
before the law, and, oddly, freedom of religion. 10 0 According to the
Constitutional Court, secularism is "an essential condition for democracy," and although freedom of religion guarantees the right to decide whether to follow any religion, that freedom does not confer an
91
See OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 41-42. The HEC essentially banned the big headscarf that covered the shoulders, but allowed the turban, which tied at the back of the head
and did not cover the shoulders. See id. at 42.
92
Id. at 43.
93
Id.
94

Id.

Id. at 45-46. The attempt was to lift the ban on the more contemporary type of
headscarves: the tirban and ba6fL.
96
Id. at 46.
95

97

Id

98 Id. It should come as no surprise that the President appoints the members of the
Constitutional Court. See Tut, . CoNsT. art. 104.
99 See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number).
100
Id. para. 36.
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absolute right to wear whatever religious attire one desires.10 1 Section
16's main constitutional difficulty was that it granted "legal recognition to a religious symbol."10 2 The Constitutional Court reasoned that
states must be neutral because this kind of "religious affirmation" has
the potential to violate a student's right to study in a "tolerant and
1 03
mutually supportive atmosphere."
Interestingly, this time the Danotay upheld the headscarf regula10 4
tion based on basic individual liberties granted by the Constitution.
Thus, a contradiction arose between the decisions of two different
Turkish high courts, resulting in "a true impasse: neither a clear yes,
10 5
nor a clear no, but bifurcation and ambivalence."
Section 17 of the Higher Education Act formed another attempt
to circumvent the Constitutional Court's holding.' 0 6 Requiring that
"choice of dress shall be free in higher-education institutions provided
that it does not contravene the laws in force,"10 7 the section's vague
wording allowed for an open interpretation and served to prevent any
recognition or affirmation of any one religion. 10 8 In a subsequent ruling in 1991, the Constitutional Court upheld section 17, despite noting in dicta that "[i]n higher-education institutions, it is contrary to
the principles of secularism and equality for the neck and hair to be
covered with a veil or headscarf on grounds of religious belief."10 9
The Constitutional Court reasoned that because it had previously
struck down a regulation that permitted headscarves, Turkish law no
longer permitted headscarves to be worn in universities" 0 and therefore section 17 did not violate the Constitutional Court's judge-made
law.
A 1999 Constitutional Court judgment stated, "The legislature
and executive are bound by both the operative provisions of [the
Court's] judgments and the reasoning taken as a whole." ' Furthermore, legislative activity must be measured against and guided by
these judgments. 112 The Constitutional Court thus essentially proclaimed that its own dicta can bind other Turkish courts when those
courts review legislative and executive action. Therefore, because the
Constitutional Court previously mentioned in a judgment that wear101
102

Id.
Id.

103
104
105
106
107

Id.
See OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 46.
Id.
See 5ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 37.
Id.

108
109

See id.

110
111
112

See id. para. 38.
Id.
Id. para. 52.
Id.
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ing headscarves in public universities is contrary to the constitutional
principle of secularism, the legislature and executive are now prohibited from enacting any legislation that would contradict this
113
conclusion.
II
LEYLA $A1iN v. TuRKEY: THE TURKISH H

A.

DSCARF CASE

Background Facts of $ahin

In February 1998, in accordance with section 13 of the Higher
Education Act, 114 the Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul University issued a
circular providing that any "students whose 'heads are covered' (wearing the Islamic headscarf) . . . must not be admitted to lectures,

courses or tutorials." 115 Specifically singling out all women who wear
the Islamic headscarf, 1 16 the circular instructs university officials to
prohibit these students from registering and from entering the university, exam rooms, or lecture halls. 117 The circular further provides
that if a woman wearing a headscarf tries to enter a classroom, the
teacher must first inform her of the ban on head coverings and then
ask her to remove her headscarf or leave. 118 The circular further suggests that the teacher should not deliver the planned lecture to the
class if the student does not comply. 119 If the student insists on wearing her headscarf, she may be suspended or expelled from the
120
university.
One month after the Vice-Chancellor issued the circular, the University of Istanbul barred Leyla $ahin, a fifth-year medical student,
from taking one of her written exams because she refused to remove
her headscarf. 12 1 $ahin comes from a traditional Muslim family from
Istanbul and considers it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf.122 Prior to the issuance of the circular, there were no violent
113 See id. para. 78.
114 Id. para. 50.
115 Id. para. 12. According to the Istanbul Administrative Court, section 13(b) of the
Higher Education Act grants the Vice-Chancellor, as the executive manager of the university under article 130 of the Turkish Constitution, the power to issue regulations and take
individual measures to maintain order. See id. paras. 15, 50-51.
116 The circular's ban applies to men with beards as well, but the Islamic headscarf is
the only head covering the circular addresses. See id. para. 12.
117 See id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 29.
118 See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 12.
119 See id.
120 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 29.
121 Press Release, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Chamber Judgments in the Cases of
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey (June 29, 2004), http://www.echr.coe.
int/eng/press/2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSahinandTekin.htm [hereinafter ECHR
Press Release].
122 $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 10.

144
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incidents or disruptions related to 5ahin's headscarf at the University
of Istanbul or at the University of Bursa, where Sahin had previously
12
studied for four years. 3

In May 1998, the University of Istanbul instituted disciplinary action against Sahin because she continued to defy the ban. 1 24 Two
months later, Sahin filed a complaint with the Istanbul Administrative
Court challenging the legality of the university's dress regulation
under the Convention. 125 The court ruled that the university's dress
regulation was lawful based on the precedent of the Constitutional
Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. 126 The following year
27
the university prevented Sahin from registering.1
$ahin also brought several claims to the ECHR. 128 First, she
claimed that Turkey's ban on the Islamic headscarf in universities interferes with her right to freedom of religion and thus violates Article
9 of the Convention. 29 According to Sahin, the headscarf ban prevents her from manifesting her religion through the practice of wearing the Islamic headscarf, a practice protected by Article 9.130 Sahin
further claimed that the ban violates Article 14, taken together with
Article 9,131 because the university discriminates against students
based on their religious beliefs and forces students to choose between
education and religion.1 32 Similarly, she argued that the headscarf
ban interferes with her right to education under Article 2 of Protocol
See id. para. 86.
Id. para. 17. Two disciplinary actions were taken against Sahin: One concerned the
issue of her refusal to remove her headscarf in the university and resulted in only a warning. See id. paras. 17-18. The second concerned her involvement in an unauthorized protest against the circular's headscarf ban in February 1999 and resulted in her suspension
from the university. See id. paras. 19-20. All disciplinary penalties were ultimately annulled
under Law No. 4584 ofJune 28, 2000. See id. para. 24; ECHR Press Release, supra note 121.
125
$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 14.
126
Id. para. 15. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed Sahin's appeal in April
123
124

2001. See id. para. 16.
127 Jean-Yves Gilg, ECtHR Upholds Muslim Headscarf Ban, THELAWYER.COM, June 29,
2004, http://lawzone.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=110678&d=205&h=207&f=259.
128 Sahin originally applied for relief in July 1998 to the now defunct European Commiss-'on of Human Rights; the ECHR ultimately accepted the claim almost four years later.
.ahin, No. 44774/98, paras. 1, 6.
129
Id. para. 64.
130
Id. According to Article 9 of the Convention:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(1).
131
See Convention, supra note 2, art. 14 ("The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."); $ahin, No. 44774/
98, para. 33.
132
See ECHR Press Release, supra note 121.
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No. 1 of the Convention, 13 3 because her choice to adhere to her relig34
ious beliefs prevented her from completing her medical studies.
Lastly, Sahin claimed that the ban also violates her rights under Articles 8 and 10135 because the ban prevents her from expressing her
136
beliefs.
B.

The ECHR's Reasoning in $ahin

On June 29, 2004, the ECHR upheld the Turkish headscarf ban,
finding that the ban does not violate Article 9.137 The ECHR did not
address $ahin's claims under Articles 8, 10, or 14 of the Convention or
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, reasoning that "the relevant circumstances

are the same as those it examined in relation to Article

''

9. 138

While

the court acknowledged that the Article 9 freedoms of thought, conscience, and most specifically religion are "foundations of a 'democratic society"' and a "precious asset,"'1 39 it maintained that "Article 9
does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief
and does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public
sphere in a way which is dictated by a belief."' 140 Instead, Article 9
protection is limited by its second section, which provides:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
14 1
rights and freedoms of others.
Thus, the ECHR considered four questions in reaching its conclusion: (1) whether the ban actually interferes with Sahin's right to
freedom of religion under Article 9; (2) whether the ban is "prescribed by law"; (3) whether the ban pursues a legitimate aim; and (4)
whether the ban is "necessary in a democratic society" within the
133
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 2, done Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9 [hereinafter Protocol] ("No person
shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in
relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.").
134
See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 116.
135
Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8(1) ("Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence."), 10(1) ("Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers.").
136
See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 116.
137
See id. para. 115.
138
Id. paras. 116-17.
139
Id. para. 66.
140
Id.
141
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
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meaning of Article 9(2).142 The ECHR quickly dispensed with the
question of whether the ban interferes with Sahin's freedom to exercise her religious faith under Article 9. The court did not decide
whether $ahin's choice to wear an Islamic headscarf actually fulfilled a
religious duty. 143 Instead, the court assumed that a woman's decision
to wear a headscarf may be considered an act of obeying a religious
precept of Islam and thus a manifestation of her desire to comply with
Islamic faith.1 44 Although the ECHR did not determine whether or
not the headscarf is a requirement of Islam, it proceeded on the assumption that the Turkish regulation interferes with $ahin's desire to
practice her religion.1 45 Once the ECHR recognized this potential
governmental interference with a right protected by Article 9, it then
analyzed the three remaining questions to determine whether Turkey
had the right to interfere with Sahin's religious practice.
With respect to the second question, the ECHR concluded that
the university's headscarf ban is indeed prescribed by law, both because the ban is accessible to the people concerned and because its
effects are sufficiently foreseeable. 146 Moreover, the ECHR found that
the Turkish Higher Education Act and the Turkish Constitutional
Court ruling that declared headscarves in universities contrary to the
Turkish Constitution are a sufficient domestic legal basis for the
ban. 14 7 Additionally, the ECHR reasoned that the Turkish Supreme
Administrative Court had held, "many years prior" to the Constitutional Court's judgment, that Islamic headscarves were incompatible
148
with Turkey's "fundamental principles."
The ECHR answered the third question, whether the headscarf
ban pursues a legitimate aim, in the affirmative as well. The court
held that the Turkish headscarf ban "primarily pursued" the legitimate government aims of protecting the rights of others and of protecting public order. 149 According to the Convention, a law that
restricts religious practice has a legitimate aim if it is implemented "in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.

' 150

Sahin herself conceded that the headscarf ban "could be

regarded as compatible" with the Turkish government's aims of
$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 67.
Id. para. 71.
144
Id.
145
See id.
146
See id. para. 81.
147
The Court specifically based its decision on section 17 of the Act, finding that the
ban had "some basis in domestic law." See id. para. 78. According to the Court, judgemade law is a valid source of law in Turkey. Md para. 77.
148
See id. para. 78; supra note 90 and accompanying text.
149
See $ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 84.
150
Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
142

143
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"maintaining public order in the universities, upholding the principle
151
of secularism, and protecting the rights and freedoms of others."
In the fourth and final step of its analysis, the ECHR concluded
that the headscarf ban's interference with Article 9 religious rights
does not violate the Convention because the ban is "necessary in a
democratic society."'1 52 The court found that the government's inter-

ference was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and was proportionate to the aims it pursued.1 53 After examining the headscarf
ban in Turkey's specific legal and social context, the ECHR concluded
that the ban is based on the principles of secularism and equality, two
principles it found "necessary for the protection of the democratic
system in Turkey."'1 54 Overturning the headscarf ban in universities
would thus significantly hinder Turkey's ability to preserve five separate state interests rooted in these principles: secularism itself, the
rights and freedoms of others, maintenance of the public order, prin15 5
ciples of plurality, and gender equality.
The ECHR's necessity analysis began with the premise that "the
principle of secularism in Turkey is undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of the State, which are [sic] in harmony with the
rule of law and respect for human rights.

' 156

The Turkish Constitu-

tional Court interprets secularism as "the guarantor of democratic values, the principle that freedom of religion is inviolable-to the extent
that it stem [s] from individual conscience-and the principle that citizens are equal before the law."' 57 The government instituted the
headscarf ban based on its belief that allowing women to wear headscarves in universities would be granting a privilege for one religion
and would thus prevent the State from being neutral-"an integral
part" of secularism. 158 Accordingly, the ECHR concluded that the
Constitutional Court's interpretation of secularism is "consistent with
the values underpinning the Convention," and therefore that upholding secularism is "necessary for the protection of a democratic system
159
in Turkey."
The ECHR further reasoned that the ban is acceptable because
permitting headscarves in universities might infringe on the rights
and freedoms of others. 160 Describing the headscarf as a "powerful
151

152
153
154
155
156
157

5ahin, No. 44774/98, paras. 82-83.
Id. paras. 114-15.
See id. para. 103.
See id. paras. 104, 106-07.
See id. paras. 104-10.

158

Id. para. 99.
&eLpara. 105 (citing a 1989 Constitutional Court judgment).
See id. paras. 93-94.

159

Id. para. 106.

160

See id. para. 108.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:129

external symbol," the court expressed concern about the headscarf's
potential proselytizing effect on those who do not wear it.' 6 ' The
Turkish governnient, as well as the ECHR, views the headscarf as a
"religious symbol [that] has taken on political significance in Turkey
in recent years" against a background of "extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious
precepts." 16 2 Thus, in the interest of protecting the freedom of
others, the court concluded that government regulations, such as the
headscarf ban, that help prevent religious fundamentalists from exerting pressure on those who do not practice their religion, can be justi16 3
fied under the Convention.
Relatedly, the ECHR noted that state universities may restrict the
place and manner of expression of religious rites and symbols when
the restriction is aimed at maintaining public order and safety. 16 4 Due
to the rise of fundamentalist groups and their use of the headscarf as a
political symbol, the ECHR also found that restricting these symbols
165
furthered "a pressing social need" to maintain public order.
The ECHR additionally found that the university headscarf ban
was necessary "to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected.' 1

66

The court implied that

upholding the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public
1 67
order and safety would preserve pluralism in the university.
Finally, the ECHR assessed the headscarf ban in relation to Turkey's protection of women's rights, noting that gender equality is one
of the "key principles underlying the Convention" and a goal for all
Convention signatories. 16 8 Deferring to the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the Turkish Constitution, the ECHR implicitly concluded that allowing women to wear the Islamic headscarf in
universities violates gender equality in Turkey.' 69 The ECHR reached
this conclusion in part because it found it hard to reconcile the Islamic headscarf, which "appeared to be imposed on women by a pre170
cept laid down in the Koran," with gender equality.
161
162

163
164

See id. para. 98, 108.
Id. paras. 108-09.
Id. para. 99.

See id.

See id. para. 109. The ECHR did not separate its analyses of "violating the rights
and freedoms of others" and "maintaining the public order and safety"; however, for the
sake of convenience, this Note analyzes these issues separately.
166
Id. para. 97.
167
See id. para. 109.
168
See id. para. 107.
169
The court referenced gender equality three times in its analysis of the headscarf
165

ban. See id,paras. 98, 107, 110.
170
See id. para. 98.
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III
EVALUATING THE

ECHR's

DECISION

The ECHR's ruling is incorrect on several legal grounds. First,
the decision gives too much deference to the Turkish Constitutional
Court. Although the ECHR has interpreted the Convention to grant a
certain margin of appreciation to individual nation-states, 171 the
ECHR is severely undercritical of Turkey's self-proclaimed interpretation of secularism, as well as the government's view of the headscarf's
threat to secularism. Second, the ECHR's review of Turkey's specific
historical, social, and legal context is incomplete and unsophisticated.
The ECHR ignores the Turkish government's role as a micromanager
of religion and fails to thoroughly analyze the headscarf law and related Turkish constitutional law. Third, the ECHR incorrectly applies
its own precedent in arguing that the headscarf violates the rights of
others.
In addition to these legal shortcomings, the ECHR appeared to
be motivated by political fears and social concerns rather than rational legal arguments. The court may have been influenced by its
own feelings about the symbolism of the headscarf and its post-September 11 fears of fundamentalist Islam. While the court presumably
had the best interests of both secular and religious women in mind,
this decision will have adverse effects on human rights, especially the
rights of women, in Turkey and in the rest of Europe.
Acting Contrary to the Goals of the Convention

A.
1.

The Margin of Appreciation

Admittedly, due to political considerations, the provisions in the
Convention are arguably the "lowest common denominator of rights"
acceptable to the Convention's drafters. 172 During the Convention
drafting committee sessions, the drafters extensively discussed possible limitations to what eventually became Article 9.173 Interestingly,
even in the 1950s when Turkey began to significantly ease up on Atatfirk-era religious restrictions, 174 Turkey fought to limit Article 9's impact on freedom of religion, arguing that certain restrictive legislation
concerning Muslim institutions was necessary in Turkey in the inter171
See id. para. 100.
172
Clive Walker & Russell L. Weaver, The United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998: The
Modernisation of Rights in the Old World, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 497, 505 (2000). The
weakness of the Convention is evident in various ways. For example, ECHR decisions are
not binding on national courts in the United Kingdom. Id. at 547.
173
See MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE
264-72 (1997).
174 See supra discussion accompanying notes 46-49.
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ests of "cultural recovery."1 75 Despite protests from the United Kingdom that allowing Turkey to keep legislation that contradicted the
Convention would be illogical, the drafters incorporated Turkey's
needs into the Article 9(2) limitations clause.' 7 6 This lowest common
denominator policy was later extended by the margin of appreciation
doctrine,1 77 which grants states varying levels of deference when they
78
interfere with Convention rights.
Despite this deference to state decision-making, Article 9(2) still
requires that a state's interfering legislation be "necessary in a democratic society."'1 7 9 While the national authorities "make the initial assessment of the 'necessity' for an interference," ultimately "their
decision remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with
the requirement of the Convention."' a8 0 The ECHR may choose from
various standards of review to evaluate the state's initial assessment of
necessity, depending upon factors such as the seriousness of the infringement, the position of the applicant, and the nature of the
right.' 8 ' If the court chose to apply a strict scrutiny standard, the
court could assess the "necessity" according to its own criteria and
182
judgment.
The .ahin Court chose not to adopt a strict scrutiny standard.
Instead, the court concluded that Turkey alone should decide what is
"necessary," reasoning that "the national authorities are in principle
better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and
conditions," and so "the role of the Convention machinery is essentially subsidiary." 183 The court asserted, "Where questions covering
the relationship between State and religions are at stake.., the role of
the national decision-making body must be given special importance." 18 4 The court thus specifically granted the State additional def175
See EVANS, supra note 173, at 269. Turkey, as well as Sweden, offered several amendments to limit the scope of religious freedom in the Convention. See id. at 267-68. According to Evans, the "entire point" of one of the proposed amendments "was to allow the
continuation of a state of affairs that was considered to be unreasonable but necessary....
This clearly contemplates the continuation of discriminatory practices." Id. at 268.

176

Id. at 270-72. Once the United Kingdom proposed to permit reservations to the

Convention instead of allowing such extensive limitations, debate shifted focus to the proposed reservations and debate about Article 9(2) essentially ceased. See id.
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(1995).
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See id.
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erence where religious symbols in teaching institutions are involved,
reasoning that there is no European consensus regarding the requirements for protecting the rights of others or public order. 85 Yet after
asserting the lack of any cohesive European stance on religious expression as a justification for defering to Turkey's interpretation of
"necessary," the court weakly admitted that it "does not exclude European supervision, especially [when] such regulations . . . entirely ne-

86
gate the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief."'
The ECHR's reluctance to strictly scrutinize Turkey's assessment
of the necessity of the headscarf ban merely because religious symbols
are involved is unsettling. Although admittedly the court generally
tends to be more deferential with Article 9 judgments than other Convention rights, 8 7 the court should feel fully capable of limiting Turkey's margin of appreciation and making a determination based on
the relevant facts of the case. This is true even in cases like $ahin's,
where the state's infringing regulation arguably does not "entirely" negate the freedom to manifest her religion. Moreover, the lack of a
European consensus on religious expression should not preclude the
ECHR from scrutinizing the acceptable bounds of state interference
with religious expression.

2.

Not All Secularism Is Created Equal

The ECHR was also too deferential to Turkey's assertion that the
headscarf ban is necessary to uphold the principle of secularism. Although most democratic societies in Europe do not rely on secularism
to define the boundaries of their democratic systems,' 8 8 the ECHR
defends the importance of secularism in Turkey, claiming the "princi-

ple may be regarded as necessary for the protection of the democratic
system in Turkey."1 89 While the court was correct in recognizing the
importance of the concept of secularism to Turkish history and law,1 90
it did not critically examine Turkey's interpretation of secularism.
The problem lies in how the ECHR itself viewed secularism: a
static political-science theory much like federalism or parliamentarianism. The ahin Court premised its analysis on its previous conclusions that "secularism in Turkey is undoubtedly one of the
fundamental principles of the State, which are [sic] in harmony with
185

See id. para. 102.

186

Id. (emphasis added).

187

Jonathan Sugden, A Certain Lack of Empathy, ZAMAN, July 1, 2004, http://www.

zaman.com/?bl=commentary&trh=20050908&hn=9995.
188 The French principle of lacite is similar to Turkey's secularism. See T. Jeremy
Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit: A Comparison of the United States and France,2004 BYU L.
Rev. 419, 428.
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$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 106.
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See supra Part I.
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the rule of law and respect for human rights."19 1 Armed with this premise, the court then essentially assumed that any action Turkey takes
to limit religious freedom in the name of secularism must be in harmony with human rights, since secularism-as an element of democracy-is itself in harmony with human rights. Aside from the obvious
consideration of Turkey's history of questionable human rights practices, 192 this assumption is unwarranted because the way a country defines secularism constantly changes and can be interpreted in
drastically different ways-as Turkish history itself has shown. 193 Consequently, simply because the ECHR has found that Turkish secularism is in harmony with the Convention as applied in the specific
contexts of previous cases, such as the Refah Partisicase, 194 the Court
should not assume a fortiori that that any Turkish regulation cloaked
in the language of secularism is always in harmony with human rights.
Instead, Turkey's secularism should be reviewed anew each time a
question involving a potential human rights violation arises, because a
new restriction in the name of secularism might not be compatible
with human rights principles.
Yet any analysis of this kind is noticeably absent from the ECHR's
opinion; the ECHR merely reiterates the Turkish Constitutional
Court's holding and unquestioningly accepts it at face value. 1 95 The
ECHR never independently analyzed Turkey's Constitution or critically inquired into the basis of the headscarfs incompatibility with secularism-an analytical flaw particularly bothersome considering that
the founding father of Turkish secularism believed the headscarf did
not conflict with the principle of secularism 9 6 and that Turkey did
not institute a headscarf ban until the 1980s.' 9 7 Thus, the ECHR
could have found the Turkish Constitutional Court's interpretation of
secularism-one that denies a right to an individual-a violation of
human rights, while simultaneously upholding the importance of secularism in Turkish democracy.

191
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An Incomplete and Superficial Review of Turkey's Social and
Legal Context

B.
1.

Turkey's Questionable Secularism and Democracy

In its reasoning for upholding Turkey's headscarf ban, the ECHR
heavily emphasized the country's commitment to upholding the principle of secularism in the interests of democracy. 19 8 Some scholars
refer to Turkey as the only Islamic country in the world that is a secular democracy. 199 But despite Turkey's self-proclaimed need to uphold secular democracy, Turkey is arguably neither secular nor a
democracy. 20 0 Since Evren's military coup in 1980, the military, which
is not elected, democratically or otherwise, has been significantly involved in both regulating and promoting religion within the country.20 1 The U.N. special rapporteur on the elimination of all forms of
religious intolerance even concluded in his 2001 report on Turkey
that "Islam is treated as if it were a 'State affair.' "202 Unbeknownst, or
at least of no concern, to the ECHR, Turkey has once again become a
theocracy and the government imposes its own religion on Turkish
society: Kemalist Islam.
Turkey's Kemalist Islam is unlike the Sharia-driven theocracy that
Atatfirk ousted with the Ottomans. Rather, the new theocracy is
loosely based on Atatfirk's Kemalism, but also incorporates Islam
when it is politically expedient to do so. The military uses its KemalistIslam-driven secularism to retain political control for itself and other
so-called secularists. But the ECHR's superficial review of the Turkish
social context unfortunately overlooks the substantial influence of the
Turkish military and its hypocritical concept of secularism.
Had the ECHR satisfied its duty under the Convention and fully
examined Turkish history, it would have discovered the following: After acquiring complete control of the Turkish government following
the 1980 military coup, Evren and the military introduced an interpretation of secularism and a series of restrictions on religious rights that
simultaneously used Islam to its political advantage and severely restricted individuals' rights to exercise their Islamic faith. 20 3 In response to the pre-coup religiously motivated violence and political
polarization, the secular-minded Evren ironically made Islamic study
compulsory in schools soon after he assumed control of the govern198 See supra Part III.A.2.
Meltem Miftfiler-Bac, The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,
199 See, e.g.,
in TuRKEY BEFORE AND AFrER ATATORK 240, 246 (Sylvia Kedourie ed., 1999).
200
See id.
See supra Part IB; see also FEROZ AHmA,, THE MAKING OF MODERN TuRKv 1-14
201
(1993) (discussing the preeminent role of the military in Turkish government).
202
Sugden, supra note 187.
203
See supra Part LB.
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ment.20 4 The government even oversees this Islamic religious education through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).2 05 The
1982 Turkish Constitution itself even includes a provision detailing
the government's role in promoting religion: "Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision
and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education
shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary
schools." 20 6 Evren intended to use a state-approved version of Sunni
Islam as a political tool "to steal the thunder of the obscurantist hocas
who would otherwise have a clear field with their fundamentalist vi20 7
sion of Islam."
In addition to regulating Islamic education, the Diyanet is also responsible for regulating Turkey's 75,000 mosques and employing
imams, who are considered civil servants in Turkey.20 The government also dictates the contents of the imam's sermons at Friday
prayers, "sometimes down to the last word." 20 9 Furthermore, only the
Diyanet is authorized to provide any Koran courses outside of the
2 10
school setting.
Non-Muslim minorities are also heavily regulated by Turkey's
"secular" bureaucracy. The General Directorate for Foundations
(Vakiflar) is responsible for regulating non-Muslim religious groups
and Muslim charitable religious foundations such as schools, hospitals, and orphanages.2 1 1 Places of worship must register and abide by
specific zoning regulations.2 12 Police have occasionally barred religious groups from holding unauthorized religious services, and prose213
cutors have sometimes even brought charges on these grounds.
But the ECHR does not discuss-or even reference in passingthese questionably theocractic practices. One scholar argues that a
state showing no interest at all in the wearing of headscarves would be
more consistent with secularism and secular democracy than a state
taking a formal position on whether a religious symbol such as the
headscarf is appropriate in universities.2 1 4 Unfortunately, the court
204
205
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214 See Rik Torfs, Turkey's Ban on the Headscarf and the European Court, ZAMAN, July 2,
2004, http://www.zaman.com/?bl=commentary&alt=&hn=10015.
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failed to recognize this secularist double standard: The military has
introduced a new theocracy based on a Kemalist version of Islam, but
at the same time will not permit the headscarf under the guise of
maintaining a secular democracy.
The role that Kemalist Islam plays in Turkish society should have
significantly influenced the method the ECHR chose to analyze
Sahin's Article 9 rights. Article 9 rights are comprised of two parts:
"the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e., the area
which is sometimes called the forum internum," and the freedom to
manifest those beliefs and creeds. 2 15 The court is eager to point out
that Article 9 religious rights are limited. 2 16 But only the freedom to
manifest one's beliefs is subject to the restrictions in Article 9(2); the
"inner" freedom of religion of the forum internum, on the other hand,
"is guaranteed in the Convention without qualification."2 1 7 The
ECHR has found that the forum internum provision of Article 9 pro2 18
tects the individual against religious indoctrination by the state.
The Convention implicitly guarantees that a person may not be subjected to actions designed to change her thought processes or her
personal opinions.2 1 9 Furthermore, a person cannot be subjected to
22 0
sanctions for holding any religious view or belief
While there are clearly two parts to Article 9, the ECHR examined only Sahin's right to manifest her religious beliefs without
ever considering how the state's ban, motivated by Kemalist Islam,
possibly violates Sahin's forum internum.2 2 1 The headscarf ban might

in fact be nothing more than the Turkish secularists' attempt to indoctrinate traditional Muslim women and convert them to the statesponsored version of Kemalist Islam. 2

22

By imposing this ban, the gov-

ernment arguably forces Muslim women who wear the headscarf to
choose which version of Islam to follow: one that traditionally requires
215

Malcom N. Shaw, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, in THE EUROPEAN SYS-

TEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 445, 448 (R. St.J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993)

(quoting C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10358/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
142, 147 (1983)).
216 See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
(search by Application
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
Number). Thus, the court begins its analysis of "necessary in a democratic society" not
with the importance of freedom of religion but rather with the notion that the freedom of
religion can be curtailed.
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them to wear a headscarf or one endorsed by the state, which views

the headscarf as contrary to the principles of secularism. Because Article 9 potentially confers on Turkish women the right to make this
choice independently, and thus the right to reject the "secular" state's
preferred religion, the court should have assessed whether banning
headscarves in universities in the name of secularism is just a pretext
for punishing women for their religious convictions and intruding
into their forum internum.
2.

Was the Ban Really Prescribed by Law?

Although the ECHR requires only a very low threshold of "some
basis in domestic law" to find that a governmental interference is "prescribed by law,"2 23 a brief inspection of the 5ahin Court's superficial
review of Turkish law is warranted. The court established that
"[]udge-made law is regarded as a valid source of law under Turkish
Law." 224 Nonetheless, the ECHR actually relied on only the Constitu2 25
tional Court's dicta as authority to uphold the ban.
Yet the status of Constitutional Court dicta is not as clear as the
ECHR purports it to be. 2 26 Even a cursory look at the Turkish Constitution shows that the Constitutional Court has no power to issue binding dicta. According to Aiticle 153:
In the course of annulling the whole, or a provision, of laws or
decrees having the force of law, the Constitutional Court shall not
act as a law-maker and pass judgment leading to new
22 7
implementation.
The Supreme Administrative Court, the Danitay, has similarly held
that the scope of the Constitutional Court's judicial review powers is
not as wide as the Constitutional Court would hope. According to the
Dani4tay:
'It is indubitably clear that.., a judicial body applying to a case a
rule in law which remains in validity and has not been struck down
by the Constitutional Court is not bound by the interpretation given
by the Constitutional Court in its own interpretation of the rule in
2 28
law.'
The Dan4tay's opinion is significant because it limits the Constitutional Court's self-proclaimed power to create legally binding law
through its dicta to apply only when the Constitutional Court strikes
223
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224
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225
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down a law. 2 29 Since the Constitutional Court actually upheld section

17 of the Higher Education Act, its dicta might not be binding. 2 30 In
other words, if the ECHR found the headscarf ban to be prescribed by
law based primarily on the Constitutional Court's dicta, the headscarf
ban may have no legal basis at all.
Furthermore, the ECHR does not identify this potential conflict
between two of Turkey's high courts: the Constitutional Court and the
Danitay. Although the ECHR correctly acknowledged the Danistay's
initial judgment regarding the headscarf,231 it failed to mention the
Danistay's most recent holdings, which permitted certain types of
headscarves based on basic individual liberties granted by the Constitution. 23 2 Thus, while the Constitutional Court unambiguously held
that headscarves are incompatible with the Constitution, the Danitay's decision is not as clear and may be contrary to that of the Constitutional Court. 23 3 Because the Dan4tay is Turkey's highest court for

controversies arising from governmental action, 2 34 the ECHR should
have analyzed the Danitay's opinion on the legality of the headscarf
ban, instead of concentrating solely on the Constitutional Court's potentially conflicting analysis of the ban.
Although admittedly a minor point, the ECHR also should have
taken at least a cursory look at the historical and social context in
which the 1982 Constitution was created. Even if the Constitutional
Court had correctly assumed its power to create binding law through
dicta, the ECHR should have recognized the source of the Constitutional Court's power: a Constitution of questionable legitimacy, created as a result of a military coup. 23 5 According to one scholar, the

1982 Constitution was "designed without the full participation or cooperation of all the major political forces in the country. Thus, [it]
contributed mainly to a crisis of political legitimacy." 2 36 Although
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
230
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
231
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text.
232
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233
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234
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235
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(Abdo I. Baaklini & Helen Desfosses eds., 1997). The NSC charged a 160-member constitutional assembly with responsibility for drafting the Constitution; however, the NSC retained complete control over the project since each member was directly or indirectly
chosen by the NSC and the NSC reserved a final say over the completed product. See
Ozbudun, supra note 26, at 25.
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91.3% of the voting population voted in favor of this vague new constitution in the referendum election, General Evren had prevented anyone from speaking out against it.237 Without any criticism or detailed
analysis of the proposed Constitution, the public may have simply
been unaware of the potential restrictions on religious liberties that
the new Constitution imposed. 23 8 Thus, with no clear constitutional
legitimacy, the ECHR should have viewed the Constitutional Court's
self-proclaimed constitutional power to formulate binding laws with
far more skepticism than it did.
C.

Expanding and Misapplying Prior Court Precedent

The ECHR also based its decision to uphold the Turkish headscarf ban in part on the premise that women who wear Islamic headscarves in universities violate the rights of others and will possibly
disrupt the public order. 239 The $ahin Court's reasoning in support
of this conclusion, however, is vague and does not comport with previous ECHR case law. The closest the ECHR ever came to explaining
how a woman wearing a headscarf violates the rights of others or upsets public order is in its overbroad recognition that the headscarf is
"a symbol, which is presented or perceived as a compulsory religious
duty"2 40 and that "extremist political movements" in Turkey seek to
impose such religious symbols on Turkish society at large. 2 41 Although the court never clearly articulated its reasoning, it appears it
has two concerns with women wearing headscarves in universities: (1)
the effect the headscarf might have as a symbol for encouraging fundamentalist Islamic movements 242 and (2) the possible proselytizing
effect it may have on other students.

243

To determine whether a woman's choice to practice her religion
by wearing a headscarf violates the rights of other students, the ECHR
should normally ask, consistent with precedent, whether limiting the
rights of one individual is proportionate to the goal of protecting the
rights of other individuals. 244 The very nature of denying one individual's right in order to protect the rights and freedoms of another is
somewhat troubling, but sometimes necessary. The key to determin237
238
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ing when one right should trump another is by striking a balance between the rights, after taking into account the context in which the
two rights conflict. 245 The court may also examine the nature of the
relationship between the parties to assist in its balancing analysis. Specifically, the court may apply a proselytizing-effect standard to determine whether the action of one party in the relationship is proselytism
246
and the other party is susceptible to coercion.
But the $ahinCourt never balanced the rights of women to manifest their religion by wearing headscarves against the rights of other
students to avoid proselytism. Even taking into account the possible
coercive nature of the headscarf, the court furthermore misapplied its
previous ruling in Dahlab v. Switzerland 247 when applying the proselytizing-effect standard. In Dahlab, the ECHR upheld a Swiss headscarf
ban prohibiting primary school teachers from wearing headscarves in
class, citing the "proselytizing effect" a teacher can have on "very
young children" even though the teacher did not discuss religion or
the headscarf with her students. 2 48 The $ahin Court found it easy to
determine that the headscarf in $ahin's situation violated the rights of
others, simply because the ECHR had previously held that the Islamic
249
headscarf violated the rights of others in another situation.
The Court's prior Dahlab ruling, however, can easily be distinguished on it facts. In Dahlab, primary school teachers were banned
from wearing headscarves in the classroom. 2 50 The atmosphere in the
primary school setting in which Dahlab wore her headscarf differs
markedly from the atmosphere of the university in which $ahin wore
hers. $ahin, a medical student herself, was not likely to exert the same
coercive pressure on her classmates or professors that a teacher does
See EVANS, supra note 173, at 328.
246 See OvEY & WHITE, supra note 5,at 266-67. For example, in Kokkinakis v. Greece, the
ECHR found that the Greek government had violated Article 9 because it was unable to
prove that the applicant attempted to proselytize through improper means that violated
Greek law. See 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45-46 (1993) (noting that the applicant went
door to door trying to teach people about Jehovah's Witness and limiting the Greek law by
requiring the proselytizing to be done through improper means, such as brainwashing or
threats, in order for it to be banned). Conversely, applicants' proselytizing in Larissis v.
Greece was contrary to state interests because of the inherent coercive nature found in "hierarchical structures" like the military, as well as the applicant's repetitive and coercive
method of seeking out religious discussion with the victim. 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 362, 380
(explaining that applicants approached the victims "on a number of occasions in order to
persuade them to convert and to visit the Pentecostal Church" and that one victim stated
that he "felt obliged to take part in the discussions because the applicants were his superior
officers").
247
2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447.
248 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 451, 463.
249 See Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number).
250
See id. para. 86.
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on her more impressionable school-aged pupils. 25 1 Furthermore, if
any of $ahin's peers or professors believed that she was attempting to
coerce or intimidate them, they had the capacity to seek assistance
from law enforcement or university officials. The Turkish government offered the ECHR no evidence that any women wearing headscarves had, in fact, proselytized or coerced any other student in the
252
university either before or after the ban was imposed.
D. The Court's Not-So-Hidden Political Agenda
1.

Gender Equality and Defining Acceptable Islamic Practice
a.

The Court's Negative Conception of the Headscarf

The $ahin decision also appears to be improperly motivated by
the ECHR's own political agenda. First, the court's opinion may have
first been influenced by its own opinions and stereotypes of the Islamic headscarf in general. 2 53 Second, the court decided to uphold
the ban on grounds that the headscarf violates gender equality. 25 4 According to one scholar, "The veil-as-a-symbol-of-Muslim-woman's-oppression discourse has its roots in a Eurocentric vision of the world
25 5
that would have the West as superior and the non-West as inferior."
Further influenced by images in the media of state-sponsored forced
veiling in Iran after the 1979 Revolution and by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Western popular culture arguably sees coercion as the only
25 6
possible reason why a Muslim woman would ever wear a headscarf.
Many of those influenced by the Iranian Revolution interpret the resurgence of veiling in 1980s Turkey as a "symbol of women's acceptance of obedience to men.

' 257

They are concerned that ending the

Turkish ban would seriously threaten the freedoms that women have
251
While the "hierarchical structures" that concerned the Larissis Court-specifically
the power and impression a military superior has over his subordinates-is clearly present
in the teacher-student relationship in Dahlab, it is notably absent among the students in
$ahin. See supra note 246.
252
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won since Atatfirk's secular revolution. 258 Many supporters of the
Turkish ban also view the headscarf as oppressive, reasoning that women who "choose" to wear the headscarf must have been brainwashed
by their families and their religion into thinking that they are required to wear it.259
The ECHR's opinion seems significantly influenced by this Western view of the headscarf. Turkey's argument to the ECHR alluded to
images of the veil imposed by the Taliban and Iranians. 260 Although
the ECHR's task was solely to determine if the Turkish headscarf ban
was necessary in a democratic society, the court used this case as an
opportunity to propagate its view of the oppressive and inequitable
nature of the Islamic headscarf. Without stating so overtly, the ECHR
hints that the headscarf ban is necessary because the Islamic headscarf
is not generally consistent with gender equality. 26' Mentioning gen2 62
der equality or general principles of equality no less than six times,

the $ahin Court adopted a paternalistic approach and reached a result
it believed would improve women's rights and equality in Europe. But
simultaneously, the court's analysis overstepped its authority by setting
substantive policy regarding acceptable religious practice for Islam.
In the court's mind, headscarves do not fit within the boundary of
acceptable religious practice, whether they are found in universities or
otherwise.
Indeed, several of the Turkish government's arguments in defense of its headscarf ban appeal to the court's concern about gender
equality issues. 2 63 The State argued that the ban is necessary in a dem-

ocratic society because the headscarf "constituted a threat to the
rights of women"; 264 that the ECHR had previously found other provisions of Sharia law contrary to the Convention, and thus this provision
is as well, a fortiori; 26 5 and that conservative female medical students
258
259
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http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application
Number). Although completely unrelated to the kind of headscarf $ahin wished to wear
in the university, the government discussed different types of headscarves and argued that
it is "difficult to reconcile all those different forms of dress derived from the same religious
rule with the principle of neutrality in State education." Id.
261
See id. paras. 98-110.
262 See id. para. 98 ("gender equality"), 104 ("equality"), 105 ("principle that citizens
are equal before the law"), 107 ("[g]ender equality"), 108 ("the rights of women"), 110
("equality before the law of men and women").
263 See id. para. 107 ("Gender equality-recognised by the European Court as one of
the key principles underlying the Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States
of the Council of Europe-was also found by the Turkish Constitutional Court to be a
principle implicit in the values underlying the Constitution." (citations omitted)).
264

Id. para. 93.

265

See id. para. 94.
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who wear the headscarf will undoubtedly engage in gender discrimi2 66
nation when they become practicing doctors.
While Turkish law generally does promote gender equality, 267 the

government's current concern that the headscarf is incompatible with
its interpretation of gender equality is nothing more than a pretext. 268
If a significant purpose of the headscarf ban was to promote gender
equality, this regulation is grossly underinclusive. The government
could have easily imposed a more extensive ban on the headscarf
throughout Turkish society-not just in government settings and
schools-in the name of protecting women's rights and the Turkish
Constitution, if it was actually concerned that the headscarf violated
principles of gender equality.
Even though Turkey's supposed concern with gender equality
was merely a subsidiary argument, the ECHR seemed almost too eager
to address this issue. The ECHR, however, never qualified its current
assessment of the headscarf's incompatibility with women's rights with
any reference to Turkey's specific legal and social context. Before the
court even began its discussion of necessity or secularism, it asserted
that the headscarf as "a precept laid down in the Koran [is] hard to
reconcile with the principle of gender equality." 2 69 Thus, even before
the ECHR undertook its analysis of whether Turkey's interference
with religious expression is relevant, sufficient, and proportionate to
the aims pursued, 270 the court already believed that conservative Islam
is not in line with gender equality. But the ECHR's stereotypes about
the Islamic headscarf are not necessarily true; there are many reasons
271
other than coercion that women choose to wear headscarves.
b.

HeadscarfBans: The Real Threat to Gender Equality

The most obvious effect of the ECHR's ruling is to effectively preclude an entire class of women from pursuing higher education in
Turkey. Although the ECHR may have intended to protect women,
the court did not adequately anticipate the repercussions of its actions. The court correctly implied that some women wear a headscarf
See id. para. 95.
See, e.g., TURK. CONST. art. 10 ("All individuals are equal without any discrimination
before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical
belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.").
268 The State's gender equality arguments were some of the last arguments the State
made. See 5ahin, No. 44774/98, paras. 90-96. Conversely, the ECHR first mentioned its
gender equality concerns in the second paragraph of its reasoning. See id. para. 98.
266
267

269

Id.

270 See id para. 103.
271
See BULLOCK, supra note 255, at 85-115 (describing six noncoercive reasons for
wearing an Islamic headscarf, including revolutionary protest, political protest, religious
reasons, access to the public sphere, expression of personal identity, and custom).
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as a result of coercion, 272 fear of physical violence, 273 or the desire to
appease their families and close-minded fundamentalists. 2 74 Perhaps
the court reasoned that if it upheld the ban on headscarves, women
would then have a valid legal excuse not to wear them and the coercive pressures would cease. But the court did not think things
through. If in fact the community that is harassing these women is as
persuasive and influential as the court suggests, then surely it can be
just as persuasive and influential in preventing these women from attending universities at all. The same so-called coercive extremist will
still frame the issue as a very simple choice: If you must go to school,
wear the headscarf, but do not go to school if you cannot wear the
headscarf.
Regardless of the reason, Turkish women who choose to wear the
headscarf must pursue education in other countries, because the ban
applies in all educational institutions in Turkey, not just in state
schools. 2 75 According to one estimate, the ban has denied the right to
education-a right purportedly guaranteed by both the Convention 276 and the 1982 Turkish Constitution 27 7-to approximately 2,000
female students who refuse to remove their headscarves. 278 Turkey's
current prime minister, Tecip Erdogan, sends his daughters to the
United States to receive a university education in part because they
choose to wear headscarves. 2 79 Unfortunately, not all Turkish women
are privileged enough to have opportunities to study in more tolerant
countries. Like the policies of forced veiling that terrorize the women
of some other Islamic countries, Turkey's ban "undercuts individual
280
autonomy and choice, a fundamental aspect of women's rights.
If the ECHR was serious about protecting women's rights and
promoting gender equality, it seems illogical to deny thousands of women a university education. If a woman is in a situation were she is
pressured into wearing a headscarf, she is going to continue to wear
the headscarf whether or not there is a ban on headscarves in the
university. What will change, however, is her access to education.
272 See ;ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 92.
273 See BULLOCK, supra note 255, at 85.
274 See id. at 67.
275 See Sahin, No. 44774/98, para. 35.
276 See Protocol, supra note 133, art. 2.
277 TURK. CONST. art. 42 ("No one shall be deprived of the right of learning and
education.").
278 Turkish Student Slams Headscarf Ruling, ALJAZEERA.NET, June 30, 2004, http://
english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5FD78EC7-EFF1445F-B090-256E5BOAC627.htn.
279
See K GAJENDRA SINGH, BATrLE OF THE HEADSCARvES IN FRANCE & TuRKEv (South
Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1116, 2004), http://saag.org/papersl2/paper116.html;
Tabitha Morgan, ScarfConundrum Grips Turkey, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513259.stm.
280
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 24.
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Consequently, the difference between a Turkey with and without a
headscarf ban is not the number of women who wear headscarves, but
rather the number of women who will receive the benefit of the
higher, secular education that the Constitutional Court values so
highly.
2.

Politically Motivated "Islamophobia"

The ECHR seems to have been further motivated to uphold the
headscarf ban by its own fears of fundamentalist Islam. Concerned
about the political significance the headscarf has acquired in Turkey,
the ECHR found that the government's headscarf ban met "a pressing
social need" to maintain the public order by taking a stance against
extremist and fundamentalist Islam in Turkey. 28 ' While the events of
September 11, 2001 confirm that fundamentalist Islam can pose a severe threat to democracy and public safety, the ECHR may have been
too quick to do its own part to make the world safe from Islamic extremists. In doing so, the court failed to recognize the less-than-subtle
distinction between fundamentalist Islam, political Islam, and an individual's act of practicing Islam, distinctions Turkey itself has difficulty
making. $ahin may have been another step in the ECHR's ongoing
attempt to limit the dangers of extremist Islam, but unfortunately this
attempt was misguided.
a.

The ECHR's Goal to Curb FundamentalistIslam

The Court's last attempt to limit what it believed was extremist
Islam was in the Refah Partisicase. 28 2 Necmettin Erbakan and his most

recent Islamic party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, or RP) won the
parliamentary elections in 1995, with Erbakan himself becoming
Prime Minister. 28 3 A year later, he formed a coalition government
with the True Path Party (TP). 28 4 Although the Erbakan government

made several attempts to lift the ban on headscarves in offices and
universities, it met opposition from Turkish secularists and even from
some factions within the TP. 28 5- Although the coalition eventually

reached a compromise to lift the ban only in universities, several ministers in the TP refused to acquiesce, believing that the HEC, not the
281 See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, paras. 108-09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29,
2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search by Application Number).
282 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267.
283 See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 109.
284
See OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 47. The fact that Erbakan and Tansu Ciller, the
head of the TP, who have drastically different ideologies about secularism and occupy opposing poles of the political spectrum, formed a coalition government can only be explained by the political benefits each party gained by forming the coalition. See id. at
47-48.
285
See id. at 47.

2005]

UNVEILING THE REAL ISSUE

government, should deal with the headscarf issue. 28 6 With an implied
threat from the military that a fourth coup would oust Erbakan from
power, Erbakan stepped down from his position. 28 7 The Constitutional Court subsequently found that the RP's existence violated the
Constitution and banned it.288 The ECHR upheld the Constitutional
Court's decision to ban the RP, 289 despite the fact that the ECHR had

unanimously held in a previous ruling that Turkey could not ban the
Turkish Communist Party, because such a ban violated Article 11 free290
dom of assembly rights.
The Turkish military is arguably justified in taking precautions
against fundamentalist Islam, which it considers one of the greatest
threats to national security.29 1 But fundamentalist Islam is not necessarily the same as political Islam-and the ECHR never made this distinction. If students wear headscarves in Turkish universities for
political reasons, it does not necessarily mean that they are extremist
fundamentalists. According to Nicole and Hugh Pope, most of the
political parties closely associated with the Islamic faith consist of "lawabiding citizens who would not think of imposing their views by
force. ' 29 2 As another scholar argues, " [P] opular Islam has never seriously challenged the modern polity," and the alleged extremism "has
often mistakenly been interpreted as though it constitutes a threat to
the very foundations of the modern, secular polity, when, in fact, it
293

does not."

b.

The Welfare Party Ban as a Basisfor the HeadscarfBan

The ECHR relied heavily on its ruling in the Rafah Partisicase to
justify the headscarf ban in $ahin. Although the Refah Partisicase was
a freedom of association case, the $ahin Court's freedom of religion
analysis cites it four times.2 94 But relying on the Refah PartisiCourt's
willingness to abridge the rights of a religious-oriented political party
as a basis to limit an individual's right to manifest her religious convictions is troubling. The $ahin Court made a connection between sup286 See id. at 47-48. The HEC would delegate authority to the individual university to
determine whether students could wear the headscarf. Id. at 48.
287 See Stephen Kinzer, Pro-IslamicPremierSteps Down in Turkey Under Army Pressure,N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1997, at Al.
288 See id.; Stephen Kinzer, Turks' High Court Orders Disbanding of Islamic Party, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at Al.
See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267.
289
290
See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
291
See SINGH, supra note 279. According to the Turkish military, if it is "not careful
about political Islam, it will lead Turkey to a new Dark Age." Id.
POPE & POPE, supra note 18, at 326.
292
OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 89-90.
293
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, paras. 99 (citing Refah Partisitwice), 108, 109
294
(Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudocen.
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pressing a political party-an entity that arguably has the ability to
influence the public, return Turkey's secular laws to a Sharia-based
system, and otherwise undermine democracy because of its position as
a government actor-and suppressing the religious rights of a single
individual. Furthermore, the court implied that Sahin and others like
her choose to wear Islamic headscarves for political reasons-a theory
that is unsupported by any evidence from either Turkey or the ECHR.
This connection between an Islamic extremist party and ordinary
individuals is problematic. The Welfare Party may have posed a danger to the Turkish democratic system-especially because factions of
that party were known extremists who openly supported a return to
Sharia law in Turkey29 5 -and banning it may thus have been "necessary in a democratic society." 296 Yet an individual who chooses to wear
a headscarf out of personal conviction, whether affiliated with the
Welfare Party or not, does not pose the same danger to democratic
society. The Turkish government never provided any evidence as to
how an individual's headscarf endangers the public order nor any examples of danger that have arisen because of women wearing the
headscarf. 29 7 While the media often uses images of veiled women to
evoke fears about fundamentalism and terrorism, 298 many Turks oppose the headscarf not simply because of these fears, but because of a
related slippery-slope argument: If the government concedes to the
Islamists on any one point, such as allowing women to wear headscarves freely, the Sharia and the end of democracy in Turkey cannot
be far behind. 299 As one scholar noted, "They reason according to the
proverb: 'If you give the devil the little finger, he will soon take the
3 00
whole hand."'
The ECHR's acceptance of this slippery-slope argument and its
belief that Sahin's headscarf was in fact politically motivated is evident
in its reasoning. Turkey argued that the headscarf is part of Sharia law
and thus incompatible with democracy.3 0 1 The $ahin Court all too
willingly accepted this argument. Citing Refah Partisi,the ECHR reasoned that Turkey is legally authorized to ban an individual's headscarf to counter extremist political movements. 302 Yet women choose

295
296
297

See Dokupil, supra note 20, at 108.
See Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
See 5ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 86.
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See BULLOCK, supra note 255, at 30.

299 Cf OZDALGA, supra note 27, at 37 (discussing this slippery-slope argument in the
context of Friday prayers).
300 Id.
301
5ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 94.
302 See id. paras. 109-10.
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to wear headscarves for many reasons, and assuming that $ahin or
30 3
others wear it for political reasons is an oversimplification.
E.

The Court's Counterintuitive Reasoning
1.

Time and Manner Restrictions or a Full Societal Ban?

Although the $ahin Court implicitly justified the ban as proportionate to its intended goals because it is restricted in time, place, and
manner, 30 4 most if not all of the Turkish government's and the
ECHR's arguments for upholding the ban can equally justify a complete national ban on the Islamic headscarf. The ECHR's broad reasoning thus may have-intentionally or unintentionally-opened the
door for the Turkish Constitutional Court to uphold an outright ban
on headscarves in all public places in Turkey. The government claims
that universities are special because they are hotbeds of political fundamentalism, but gives no examples other than allusions to historic
violence, which was not limited to the universities. 30 5 Nor does the
ECHR require any such evidence from Turkey. If the government
and the ECHR were legitimately concerned about fundamentalist
pressures, why not apply the ban to all public areas of Turkish
30 6
society?
Unfortunately, the ECHR's reasoning upholds the headscarf ban
in terms that apply not only to the university setting but also seem to
justify a complete ban in Turkish society. The ECHR was more realistic in its assessment of the reach of fundamental pressures than the
Turkish government: "[T]here are extremist political movements in
Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols .... "307 Because mosques and private Islamic educational institutions are also regulated by the state 3 8 and are thus within the "sphere
of state education, '

30

9

perhaps this ruling already extends to ban wo-

men from wearing headscarves in those locations as well. How much
farther can the ban extend under the court's reasoning to protect "society as a whole"?
303

See BULLOCK, supra note 255, at 85-87.

See 5ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 93. The State described the ban as limited to locations that are within the "sphere of State education." Id.
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See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
306
If anything, the ban is more logical outside the university context. The university is
a contained environment, where violence and insurgency can be closely monitored. The
government would have a much more difficult time regulating religiously motivated violence on the public streets of Turkey than in well-monitored universities. Thus, the ban
would be more helpful in countering extremist movements if it applied outside the
university.
307
$ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 109 (emphasis added).
308
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CounterintuitiveInterests of Pluralism

Quite possibly the most embarrassing and poorly reasoned of the
ECHR's rationales for upholding the headscarf ban is the court's goal
of promoting the interests of "pluralism in universities." 3 10 The court
justified the limitation on a woman's right to wear a headscarf for religious reasons in universities by reasoning that "it may be necessary to
place restrictions on freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in
order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone's beliefs are respected." 3 11 This particular reasoning for curtailing freedom is flawed on several accounts.
First, it is impossible to respect everyone's beliefs when upholding the infringement of a fundamental right. The beliefs of an entire
class of women are clearly not respected by a decision that forces them
to abandon either their religious convictions or their educational
aspirations.
Second, it is illogical to attempt to advance the cause of pluralism
by excluding an entire class of women with particular beliefs from the
university system. The only atmosphere that the headscarf ban can
possibly foster in the university community is a completely homogonous, secularized student body devoid of dissenting voices.
Third, it is inconsistent with the ECHR's own precedent. The
$ahin Court emphasized limiting freedom of religion in order to foster pluralism, but in a prior judgment, the ECHR maintained quite
the opposite position when it stated, "The pluralism indissociable
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centu31 2
ries, depends on [freedom of religion]."
CONCLUSION

Atatfirk's philosophy of secularism and the reforms he implemented concerning religious observance are still passionately debated. While the European Court of Human Rights had the
opportunity to add an element of reason to the debate, it instead let
its own stereotypes and fears deny the fundamental right of religious
freedom to an entire group of people. But even more indefensibly,
the ECHR's failure to review the Turkish headscarf ban in its social
and historical context as required by the Convention indefinitely denies an entire class of women access to education.
310

See 5ahin, No. 44774/98, para. 109.

Id. para. 97.
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1993). The ECHR's holding
on pluralism in 5ahin is clearly not the first holding that completely ignores the court's
own prior case law. See, e.g., supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
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The ECHR's decision to uphold the university headscarf ban in
$ahin represents a massive blow to freedom of religious expression in
Europe. Not only is the decision contrary to the purposes of the Convention, but it also creates precedent that is likely to further restrict
fundamental rights in the future. The holding acknowledges and approves of a government's use of theocratic secularism as a weapon in
the battle against Islamic fundamentalism. Whether or not the Court
intended to do so, this decision also further solidifies the role of the
military as an extragovernmental authority and legitimizes its constant
threat of coup to retain its power.
On the whole, the ECHR's legal reasoning is counterintuitive, circular, vague, unsupported, and plagued with shifts in scope. The
court justified placing a ban on headscarves in the university setting,
while its rationale could easily apply to a total ban in Turkish society.
In addition to the legal inefficiencies with the court's decision and the
incomplete analysis of Turkish history, the ECHR's decision completely glosses over the true nature of the Turkish military's relationship with the state's governmental organs and its questionable
method of "strictly appl[ying] the principle of secularism. '3 13 The
court even goes so far as to awkwardly assert that excluding women
who wear headscarves from higher education can actually serve the
3 14

interests of plurality.
Despite the ECHR's June 2004 ruling, hope is not lost for women
in Turkey who believe that wearing a headscarf is a religious duty.
The ECHR's seven-person Chamber judgment is not the last word the
court will have on the headscarf issue. One day after the ECHR released its judgment, Sahin applied to the Grand Chamber panel for a
referral. 315 On November 22, 2004, the ECHR announced that a fiveperson panel had accepted Sahin's appeal and referred the case to
the Grand Chamber to reevaluate-and possibly reverse-the Chamber's legally flawed and politically motivated decision. 31 6 Although
there does not appear to be much that Turkish women who wear
headscarves can do to maintain their rights, the debate is not over yet.
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